Busted on Video | Photographer Arrested

Civil Rights, consent to search, Copwatch, Drug Bust, Michael P Maddux, Probable Cause, search warrant,
Citizen Journalist

Drug Bust on Video


Tampa Drug Defense Attorney Michael P Maddux has recently reviewed a case where there was a Drug Bust on Video. The citizen photographer was arrested. Criminal Defense issues will be was there a Search Warrant, Probable Cause, or Consent to Search? The video mentions a "warrant", but the police office claims consent to search the vehicle.

Civil Rights issue will be can the police arrest a citizen reporter recording police actions on a city street? What do you think?



Documentary | Copwatch: These Streets are Watching

Dog Sniff Delay Of 20 Minutes is Too Much - Case Dismissed


drug dog, dog sniff, supreme court drug dog Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)
Dog Sniff Delay Of 20 Minutes is Too Much 

Dog Sniff Delayed in Florida

Doggie delayed is Justice denied?

This guy was driving on I-75 in Alachua County near Gainesville Florida home of the Florida Gators. The cop claimed he had cut off a truck, perform a traffic stop, and then called for a drug dog. This case has the shortest delay I have ever seen in any drug dog case since the Supreme Court ruled recently. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).

The delay was at most 20 minutes. This court essentially ruled that any delay without a reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. Doggie delayed is Justice denied?

One commentator summarized, "Trial court erred in denying motion to suppress drugs found after dog alerted to presence of narcotics in vehicle where traffic stop was delayed in order to perform dog sniff and there was no basis in record to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to justify prolonging the stop . . . ." Florida Law Weekly 

Excerpts From Dog Sniff Opinion


"driving on I-75 when he was pulled over by an officer due to an improper lane change that cut off a semi-truck. At the initiation of the traffic stop, the officer called for a K-9 unit to perform a sniff search"

 "sixteen minutes later, and twenty minutes into the stop, the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, and Wooden was placed under arrest and charged with possession of a controlled substance"

"the trial court found that the traffic stop was delayed, characterizing it as “de minimis” and a “very little” delay. As Wooden points out on appeal, the decision in Rodriguez does not frame the quantum of permissible delay in these terms. Rather, the “critical question . . . is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’” 135 S. Ct. at 1616."

"because there is no basis in the record to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to justify prolonging the stop . . . we REVERSE the trial court’s order denying . . .  dispositive motion to suppress and REMAND with instructions to vacate his conviction."
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)
20 Minutes is Too Much - Drug Case Tossed



Complete Dog Sniff Opinion


FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D16-2077
_____________________________
GREGORY WOODEN,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Mark W. Moseley, Judge.
April 18, 2018
PER CURIAM.

Gregory Wooden appeals his conviction for possession of narcotics, arguing that the traffic stop that led to his arrest was unconstitutionally prolonged in order to perform a dog sniff search.
At approximately midnight on September 30, 2015, Wooden was driving on I-75 when he was pulled over by an officer due to an improper lane change that cut off a semi-truck. At the initiation of the traffic stop, the officer called for a K-9 unit to perform a sniff search of the exterior of Wooden’s car. After its arrival approximately sixteen minutes later, and twenty minutes into the stop, the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, and Wooden was placed under arrest and charged with possession of a controlled substance without a prescription. Wooden moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the original traffic stop that led to his arrest

2

was prolonged in order to perform the dog sniff search, contrary to the dictates of Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). The trial court denied the motion, stating that Wooden was “not unreasonably detained during the traffic stop as [the officer] was still in the process of issuing a written warning to the Defendant while the narcotics K-9 alerted to the Defendant’s vehicle.” Appellant pled nolo contendere to the possession charge, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the dispositive motion.

In its oral pronouncement, the trial court found that the traffic stop was delayed, characterizing it as “de minimis” and a “very little” delay. As Wooden points out on appeal, the decision in Rodriguez does not frame the quantum of permissible delay in these terms. Rather, the “critical question . . . is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’” 135 S. Ct. at 1616.

Because the trial court concluded that time was added, which delayed the traffic stop before the dog sniff was performed, it was necessary for the trial court to make a baseline finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Wooden for the prolonged period during which the sniff occurred. Although an officer “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. . . ., he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 1615. Because reasonable suspicion was not addressed below, and because there is no basis in the record to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to justify prolonging the stop in accordance with Rodriguez, we REVERSE the trial court’s order denying Wooden’s dispositive motion to suppress and REMAND with instructions to vacate his conviction. See Maldonado v. State, 992 So. 2d 839, 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

RAY, MAKAR, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
3
_____________________________
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Richard M. Bracey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Mysterious Marijuana Delivery from UPS and The Party Animal

Mysterious Marijuana Delivery Cannabis and UPS in Polk County
Mysterious Marijuana Delivery
The cops in Polk County Intercepted a package at United Parcel Service. They got a search warrant for the package opened it and found 10 pounds of weed. The cops then dressed as a UPS delivery driver and tried to deliver the package to a residence in Lakeland. The residents wisely declined to accept the delivery and were observed walking around their yard. One guy had a hairstyle that was described as being like Popeye with a pipe painted green in his mouth. The cop said that that was consistent with a person who was waiting for a marijuana delivery and detained him. Court ruled even a "pot-smoking sailor hair design" is not enough to save this bust.

"Mr. Mason was observed to have a design cut into his hair that apparently resembled Popeye (the famed cartoon sailor) with the pipe spray-painted green. Mr. Mason explained to the detectives that the color green signified marijuana."

The cop then threatened to search a vehicle, call a dog, and then searched everything. Ultimately drugs were found everywhere. A motion to suppress was filed in the trial court and the motion was denied. However, the district court of appeals just ruled that the strange Popeye hair design and pacing frantically around your yard does not constitute grounds to detain people for a marijuana investigation and search.


"Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress as it pertains to Mr. Johns, as well as the judgments and sentences that were entered based upon his plea agreement. "


Excerpts from the Opinion:

A mysterious parcel package was intercepted while en route to be delivered.  It contained approximately ten pounds of marijuana.  Someone sent the package.  Someone was presumably going to pick it up.  The principal question this appeal presents is whether investigating detectives had a reasonable suspicion that in the driveway of the package's destination.  We hold they did not. 

In early December 2012, a detective monitoring shipments in a UPS facility discovered a suspicious looking package from "The Party Animal" addressed to a fictitious person named "Raymond Maven" that was on its way to be delivered to an address on West Dossey Road in Lakeland.  He obtained a search warrant, opened it, and found about ten pounds of marijuana in heat-sealed bags.

As the detectives watched, Detective Edison, disguised as a UPS driver, approached the duplex, knocked on the unit door, and waited.  No one ever answered, and so the disguised detective left without leaving the package behind.  A short while later, Mr. Whitaker emerged from the unit's doorway and appeared to look around the front door and yard before returning inside. 

We need not recount the lengthy trail of warrants and evidence that proceeded from the arrest of Messrs. Mason and Johns.  Suffice it to say that there were more illegal drugs found in Mr. Mason's car at the gas station, more incriminating evidence found on Mr. Mason's cell phone, and, pertinent here, the entirety of the evidence the State would use against Mr. Johns in the case at bar.

Mr. Johns filed a motion to suppress this incriminating evidence.  After hearing the evidence described above, the circuit court denied the motion.

Mr. Mason, who had been seen at the same duplex earlier and whose pot-smoking sailor hair design and furtive actions at the duplex (pacing in the driveway, talking on his cell phone, looking around) were "consistent with someone that is looking for a package of cannabis as opposed to someone that is looking to rent a room"

And to the extent Mr. Mason's actions could be said to have generated a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (an issue we do not reach here), Mr. Mason's appearance and activities that morning would not supply a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Johns was connected with those activities, absent some evidence of an actual connection.

Having determined he was illegally stopped, we readily agree with Mr. Johns that the consent he gave to search his vehicle was invalidated by his unlawful detention.  We have previously explained:
If a person has been illegally seized by police and subsequently consents to a search, "the State bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing proof that there was an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of the law enforcement's prior illegal activity."

The vehicle's mere presence near the scene is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that its occupants were connected . . . .

"Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress as it pertains to Mr. Johns, as well as the judgments and sentences that were entered based upon his plea agreement. "



The Marijuana Court Opinion:



Can Drug Charges Destroy Opportunities for Student Financial Aid?

FAFSA No Student Aid After Drug Conviction
No Student Aid After Drug Conviction
Can a student lose financial aid for the possession or sale of illegal drugs that occurred while receiving federal student aid?

Yes. If you are convicted of possessing or selling drugs after you submit your FAFSA, (Free Application for Federal Student Aid) you must notify the financial aid administrator at your college immediately. You will lose your eligibility for federal student aid and will be required to pay back all aid you received after your conviction.

“Have you been convicted for the possession or sale of illegal drugs 
for an offense that occurred while you were receiving federal student aid 
(grants, work-study, and/or loans)? Yes [or] No”

Drug Conviction Questions for Federal Student Financial Aid Worksheet Question 23

Drug Conviction - FAFSA Student Aid Application
FAFSA Student Aid
Application

Source: https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bw1ZJqIwtQE4NlBXLTJzeHYxMGs0N3RuaXBrVnB2ZWFMZ3hZ

How to regain eligibility for Financial Aid after a conviction?


The rules require that someone who has become ineligible due to a drug conviction must complete an approved rehabilitation program or pass two drug screens administered by a drug rehab program. Once either of these options have been completed, you can become eligible for financial aid again. Failure to comply with these rules can result in liability to return any financial aid received while the person was ineligible due to a drug conviction.


Drug Convictions and Federal Student Aid


If you are convicted of possessing or selling drugs after you submit your FAFSA, you must notify the financial aid administrator at your college immediately. You will lose your eligibility for federal student aid and will be required to pay back all aid you received after your conviction.

Students who are receiving financial aid can have their financial aid eligibility suspended if they are convicted while they are receiving federal student aid student grants, student loans, or work-study benefits. When a financial aid form (FAFSA) is completed, there is a question that asks about drug convictions or offenses that may have occurred while receiving student aid. If a student answers "yes" to this question, they must complete the worksheet that we have included below.

Students seeking financial aid must complete a worksheet because it was reported that they had a conviction for possessing or selling illegal drugs or because they left question 23 on the Student Financial Aid Worksheet or the question was not answered or left blank. Here is a sample worksheet sent to a student.

Federal Student Aid Eligibility Worksheet



 
Source: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bw1ZJqIwtQE4ejh3Z2lFQmNic3JyRlpuNXllZ042RlV4ejdj/view?usp=sharing 

 Here are the key questions that will impact your eligibility:

1. Have you ever received Federal Title IV financial aid? Answer “No” if you have never received Federal student grants, Federal student loans or Federal Work Study. You should also answer “No” if you have never attended college.

If Yes, go to question 2 on this worksheet.

2. Have you been convicted for the possession or sale of Illegal drugs for an offense that occurred while you were receiving Federal Title IV financial aid (grants, loans and/or Federal Work Study)? Only include federal and/or state convictions. Do not include any convictions that have been removed from your record or that occurred before you turned age 18, unless you were tried as an adult.

If Yes, go to question 3 on this worksheet.

3. Did the offense for possessing or selling illegal drugs occur during a period of enrollment for which you were receiving Federal Title IV financial aid (grants, loans and/or Federal Work Study)?

If Yes, go to question 4 on this worksheet.

4. Have you completed an acceptable drug rehabilitation program since your conviction?

An acceptable drug rehabilitation program must include at least two unannounced drug tests, and:

(1) Be qualified to receive funds from a federal, state or local government or from a federally or state-licensed insurance company; or

(2) be administered or recognized by a federal, state or local government agency or court or a federally or state-licensed hospital, health clinic or medical doctor.

If Yes, you are eligible for Federal Title IV financial aid. Sign the certification on page 2 and return this form to One- Stop Student Services

If No, go to question 5 on this worksheet.

5. Do you have more than two convictions for possessing illegal drugs? Only count convictions for offenses that occurred during a period of enrollment for which you were receiving Federal Title IV financial aid (grants, loans and/or Federal Work Study).

If Yes, you are not eligible for Federal Title IV financial aid for this school year unless you completed an acceptable drug rehabilitation program or passed two unannounced drug tests administered by an acceptable drug rehabilitation program. Even if you are not eligible for Federal Title IV financial aid, you may still be eligible for aid from the State of Florida.

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/eligibility/criminal-convictions#incarcerated

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/eligibility/regain#drug-convictions

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/eligibility/criminal-convictions#suspended-eligibility

Federal Student Aid Eligibility Worksheet



Drug Crimes Defense - Board Certified - 813-222-2220

Drug Crimes Lawyer Tampa

Drug Crimes Lawyer Tampa



"Free Phone Consultation directly with a Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer"


Casey Ebsary is a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with diverse criminal litigation experience in drug cases.

813-222-2220


Fast, Easy, and Free Phone Consultation directly with a Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer.  I will personally speak to you about your charges.

Conveniently Located: Tampa, Florida 

Law Office of W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr
2102 W Cleveland St
Tampa, Florida 33606
(813) 222-2220
centrallaw@centrallaw.com

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Call Casey at 813-222-2220 or Toll Free 1-877-793-9290.


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Having a Couple of Marijuana plants in your Florida back yard just got easier


Marijuana Grow, Knock and Talk, marijuana, cannabis

Marijuana Grow Conviction Overturned - Knock and Talk


Having a couple of marijuana plants in your Florida back yard just got easier. A Marijuana grower in Pasco County, Florida's Spring Hill was cleared this week when cops ignored several signs that the guy's home was intended to be private. Aggressive drug law enforcement did not stop at a gate, a beware of dog sign, and a no trespassing sign and came to the residence to knock on the door and talk about information they had received from a tipster. In copspeak this is a "knock and talk."

"After entering the property through this gate, the officers located Mr. Robinson and convinced him to allow them to search the property. They found the two marijuana plants behind Mr. Robinson's house.  This resulted in the State's prosecution of Mr. Robinson for manufacturing marijuana."


ALFRED ROBINSON, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Case No. 2D13-4412

Opinion filed May 22, 2015. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Mary Handsel, Judge. 

ALTENBERND, Judge.

Alfred Robinson appeals a withhold of adjudication and a three-year term of probation for the offense of manufacturing marijuana in violation of section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012).  The withhold of adjudication and sentence were imposed as a result of a plea following the denial of a dispositive motion to suppress. 

The motion to suppress was based on the fact that detectives entered Mr. Robinson's property without a warrant or permission. We conclude that the detectives could not enter the property to conduct a knock and talk or to pursue a consensual encounter with Mr. Robinson without first obtaining his permission to enter the property. We reach this conclusion because the property, a semirural homestead where the detectives found two marijuana plants, was surrounded by a chain-link fence; had a closed gate with a "no trespassing—violators will be prosecuted" sign and a "beware of dog" sign; and had a mailbox accessible from outside the fence. These facts distinguish this case from Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).  Accordingly, the trial court was required to grant the motion to suppress.  We remand for the trial court to vacate the withhold of adjudication and sentence and dismiss the proceeding.

On July 24, 2012, three detectives went to Mr. Robinson's property on a semirural road in Spring Hill, Florida. They were investigating an anonymous tip that the house on the property was used to grow marijuana. It is undisputed that the detectives did not have a warrant and had not performed an investigation to establish probable cause for such an offense.  When they arrived, they discovered that the property, a small acreage, was completely surrounded by a chain-link fence. The only entrance gate was closed but not locked. Although the detectives did not recall any signs on the property, the trial court found that both a "no trespassing" sign and a "beware of dog" sign were posted at the entrance. The mailbox was on a post at the fenced line outside the gate so that the mailman did not need to enter the property.

After entering the property through this gate, the officers located Mr. Robinson and convinced him to allow them to search the property. They found the two marijuana plants behind Mr. Robinson's house.  This resulted in the State's prosecution of Mr. Robinson for manufacturing marijuana.

Mr. Robinson filed a motion to suppress arguing that the detectives' entry onto his property was an illegal search and that the State had failed to prove that his subsequent consent to search was voluntary. The trial court denied the motion based on this court's decision in Nieminski. On appeal, the parties agree that the dispositive issue is whether the detectives were authorized to enter the property without a warrant or consent.

Our decision in Nieminski involves a similar anonymous tip and a similar fence, but the opinion emphasizes that the "property was not posted with 'no trespassing' signs" and "did not have any other signs that might discourage a person from entering."  Id. at 522-23. There was no evidence to establish the location of the mailbox.  This court held that Mr. Nieminski failed to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy that included the right to assume ordinary citizens would not open his gate and knock on his front door. See id. at 528-29.

Unlike Mr. Nieminski, Mr. Robinson did establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this property because ordinary citizens would not disregard his threat of prosecution and the risk of a bad dog to enter through his closed but unlocked gate. This case is more similar to the cases distinguished in Nieminski and to this court's recent decision in Ferrer v. State, 113 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). 

In the trial court, because the entry onto the property was found to be lawful, the State was only required to prove that Mr. Robinson's consent was voluntary by the preponderance of the evidence. See Faulkner v. State, 834 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Had the trial court found the entry to be unlawful, the State would have faced the heavier burden of overcoming the presumption that Mr. Robinson's consent was not voluntary by clear and convincing evidence.  See id. Without detailing the evidence, we agree with the State's concession on appeal that the evidence would not establish voluntary consent under this heightened standard.

Although we do not have occasion to recede from Nieminski, we note that the Nieminski decision relied significantly on the "reasonable expectation" test derived from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Nieminski, 60 So. 3d at 524-29. We recognized that the officers in that case may have committed a trespass under section 810.09, Florida Statutes (2008). Id. at 528-29. We discussed cases in which an officer's trespass had not been treated as a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on the Katz analysis. Id.  Since our decision in Nieminski, however, the United States Supreme Court has twice written divided decisions relying upon a pre-Katz trespass analysis. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Whether these cases would now require a different outcome in Nieminski is open for debate but is not a matter that we need to decide today. Reversed and remanded. 
  
CASANUEVA and BLACK, JJ., Concur.  


Video - Florida Growhouse Shoot Em Up

Shoot Out at a Florida Growhouse

Florida Growhouse Video Shoot Out
Florida Growhouse Video Shoot Out

Shots Fired at 15 seconds and video ends with smoke detector alert.

Florida Growhouse Shoot Out video just obtained by Florida Drug Crimes Lawyer W.F. "Casey" Ebsary, Jr. Sheriff says "Just after midnight on March 28, deputies responded to an incident where two armed men entered a residence to 12524 Burgess Hill Drive Riverview, FL 33579, USA, in the Panther Trace subdivision and exchanged gunfire with the occupants.  There are no know injuries and the suspects have fled the scene.  Deputies have determined this incident does not appear random and appears to have been drug related."




Detectives are releasing surveillance video of three suspects who unlawfully entered 12524 Burgess Hill Drive Riverview, FL and exchanged gunfire with suspected drug dealers inside.

Anyone with any information in reference to this incident is asked to call .

Map Of Alleged Grow House



DRUG3912 TRAFFICKING IN ILLEGAL DRUGS 4 TO 14 GRAMS

Drug Trafficking


Trafficking 4 to 14 Grams
Morphine, Opium,
Oxycodone,
Hydrocodone, Hydromorphone 
"shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years"


If you have been charged with DRUG3912 TRAFFICKING IN ILLEGAL DRUGS 4 TO 14 GRAMS you can call a Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney for FREE at 813-222-2220 to fight for you or a friend.

Trafficking drugs under Florida is based upon the weight of the substance, not the actual conduct of the person who has been charged. The crime can be committed even if no drugs were actually sold to anyone. The mere possession of a scheduled compound, in the requisite amount can generate a charge of drug trafficking.

"Constructive possession means the controlled substance is 
in a place over which the (defendant) has control, 
or in which the (defendant) has concealed it."

Form Code: DRUG3912

Florida Statute: 893.135.1C1A
Level: Fel (Felony)
Degree: 1st
Description: TRAFFICKING IN ILLEGAL DRUGS 4 TO 14 GRAMS

Trafficking 4 to 14 Grams Morphine, Opium, 
Oxycodone, Hydrocodone, Hydromorphone

DRUG3912 TRAFFICKING IN ILLEGAL DRUGS 4 TO 14 GRAMS is often charged in Hillsborough County, Florida.


Chapter 893 DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL


893.135 Trafficking; mandatory sentences; suspension or reduction of sentences; conspiracy to engage in trafficking.

(1) Except as authorized in this chapter or in chapter 499 and notwithstanding the provisions of s. 893.13:

(c)1. Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 4 grams or more of any morphine, opium, oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, or any salt, derivative, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in s. 893.03(1)(b), (2)(a), (3)(c)3., or (3)(c)4., or 4 grams or more of any mixture containing any such substance, but less than 30 kilograms of such substance or mixture, commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in illegal drugs,” punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. If the quantity involved:

a. Is 4 grams or more, but less than 14 grams, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years, and the defendant shall be ordered to pay a fine of $50,000.



"To prove the crime of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, the State must prove . . ."


Florida Jury Instruction on TRAFFICKING IN ILLEGAL DRUGS
§ 893.135(1)(c), Fla. Stat.

            Certain drugs and chemical substances are by law known as “controlled substances.” (Specific substance alleged) or any mixture containing (specific substance alleged) is a controlled substance.

            To prove the crime of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

            1.         (Defendant) knowingly

                                    [sold]
                                    [purchased]
                                    [manufactured]
                                    [delivered]
                                    [brought into Florida]
                                    [possessed]

                        a certain substance.

2.         The substance was [morphine] [opium] [oxycodone] [hydrocodone] [hydromorphone] [heroin] [(specific substance alleged)] [a mixture containing [morphine] [opium] [oxycodone] [hydrocodone] [hydromorphone] [herion] [(specific substance alleged)]].

3.         The quantity of the substance involved was 4 grams or more.

            See State v. Dominguez, 509 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1987).
4.         (Defendant) knew that the substance was [[morphine] [opium] [oxycodone] [hydrocodone] [hydromorphone] [heroin] [(specific substance alleged)] [a mixture containing [morphine] [opium] [oxycodone] [hydrocodone] [hydromorphone] [heroin] [(specific substance alleged)]].

            If applicable under the facts of the case and pursuant to § 893.135(2), Fla. Stat., the following bracketed language should be given instead of element 4 above.  For example, if it is alleged that the defendant intended to sell heroin but actually sold (specific substance alleged), the alternate element 4 would be given.
[4.        (Defendant) intended to [sell] [purchase] [manufacture] [deliver] [bring into Florida] [possess] (an enumerated controlled substance in § 893.135(1), Fla. Stat.), but actually [sold] [purchased] [manufactured] [delivered] [brought into Florida] [possessed] (specific substance alleged) or a mixture containing (specific substance alleged).]

            Definitions.  Give as applicable.
            Sell.
            “Sell” means to transfer or deliver something to another person in exchange for money or something of value or a promise of money or something of value.

            Manufacture.  § 893.02(13)(a), Fla. Stat.
            “Manufacture” means the production, preparation, packaging, labeling or relabeling, propagation, compounding, cultivating, growing, conversion or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly.  Manufacturing can be by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis. It can also be by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis.

            Deliver.  § 893.02(5), Fla. Stat.
            “Deliver” or “delivery” means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.

            Possession.
            To “possess” means to have personal charge of or exercise the right of ownership, management, or control over the thing possessed.

            Possession may be actual or constructive.

            Actual possession means:

a.         The controlled substance is in the hand of or on the person, or

b.         The controlled substance is in a container in the hand of or on the person, or

c.         The controlled substance is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person.

            Give if applicable.
            Mere proximity to a controlled substance is not sufficient to establish control over that controlled substance when it is not in a place over which the person has control.

            Constructive possession means the controlled substance is in a place over which the (defendant) has control, or in which the (defendant) has concealed it.

            In order to establish constructive possession of a controlled substance if the controlled substance is in a place over which the (defendant) does not have control, the State must prove the (defendant’s) (1) control over the controlled substance and (2) knowledge that the controlled substance was within the (defendant’s) presence.

            Possession may be joint, that is, two or more persons may jointly possess an article, exercising control over it. In that case, each of those persons is considered to be in possession of that article.

            If a person has exclusive possession of a controlled substance, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed.

            If a person does not have exclusive possession of a controlled substance, knowledge of its presence may not be inferred or assumed.

            Knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance.  Give if applicable.  § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat.
            Knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance is not an element of the offense of (insert name of offense charged).  Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense.  (Defendant) has raised this affirmative defense.  However, you are permitted to presume that (defendant) was aware of the illicit nature of the controlled substance if you find that (defendant) was in actual or constructive possession of the controlled substance.

            If from the evidence you are convinced that (defendant) knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, and all of the elements of the charge have been proved, you should find (defendant) guilty.

            If you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether (defendant) knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, you should find (defendant) not guilty.

            See State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1991).
            If you find the defendant guilty of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, you must further determine by your verdict whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:

            Enhanced penalty.  Give if applicable up to extent of charge.
a.         [The quantity of the substance involved was 4 grams or more but less than 14 grams.]

b.         [The quantity of the substance involved was 14 grams or more but less than 28 grams.]

c.         [The quantity of the substance involved was 28 grams or more but less than 30 kilograms.]

d.         [The quantity of the substance involved was 30 kilograms or more.]

Lesser Included Offenses

TRAFFICKING IN ILLEGAL DRUGS — 893.135(1)(c)1 and 2
CATEGORY ONE
CATEGORY TWO
FLA. STAT.
INS. NO.
Trafficking offenses requiring lower quantities of illegal drugs

893.135(1)(c)1
25.11

Attempt (but not conspiracy), except when delivery is charged
777.04(1)
5.1

If sale, manufacture or delivery is charged
893.13(1)(a)
25.2

If purchase is charged
893.13(2)(a)


Bringing same illegal drug as charged into state
893.13(5)


Possession of same illegal drug
893.13(6)(a)


Comment

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985 [477 So. 2d 985], 1987 [509 So. 2d 917], 1989 [543 So. 2d 1205], 1997 [697 So. 2d 84], and 2007 [969 So. 2d 245].  See also SC03-629 [869 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004)].

Pinellas Marijuana Charges Help Video on YouTube 813-222-2220

Casey has has a fully searchable Pinellas Cannabis Marijuana defense database on marijuana and drug charges in Florida. This video discusses and Compares How to use probable cause and the possibility of drug charges being dismissed when police improperly search for and then seize contraband.

Casey reviews Minimum Mandatory sentences may apply to some Drug Trafficking cases. W.F. "Casey" Ebsary, Jr. is a Board Certified Criminal Trial expert who defends drug crimes in Pinellas County, Florida.





Transcript: Pinellas Marijuana Defense Lawyer Narrates] Hundreds of people are arrested every day. You may be one of them. I spend most of my time defending cases in State and Federal Courts. Many times drug crimes arise from searches of motor vehicles. Sometimes police will stop a car and then search it. Sometimes we are able to attack these searches when police do not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the motor vehicle. In the event we can suppress the evidence, we may be able to have the drug charges dismissed, since there is no longer any evidence to be admitted against you in a criminal prosecution and evidence becomes unavailble for admission in a trial. I have arrived at my destination - one of the many courthouses in Tampa Bay where I help people. Let me help you. Criminal charges in State or federal Court? Let me help. Call me at 813-222-2220. Let me drive to court to help you.[End of  Pinellas Marijuana Defense  Attorney Narration]


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Pinellas Marijuana Defense Lawyer

Video: Pinellas Marijuana Defense Lawyer 813-222-2220 Video on YouTube


 This video discusses and Compares How to use probable cause and the possibility of drug charges being dismissed when police improperly search for and then seize contraband.

Tampa Hillsborough Clerk - Fines Court Costs

Tampa Criminal Fines and Court Costs
Tampa Criminal Fines and Court Costs

Tampa Criminal Fines and Court Costs




Tampa Criminal Defense Lawyer Casey Ebsary reports there is a new program for paying fines and court costs at the Tampa Court House, Clerk of Court. For more information on the program see here: Tampa Criminal Defense Lawyer - Fines Court Costs

Here is a quick Q & A on the Clerk of Circuit Court C-Pay Partial Payment Plan:

What is C-Pay?


C-Pay allows you to make monthly payments on your case(s) until the balance is zero.


Who is eligibie for C-Pay?


C-Pay is open to anyone who is involved in a case and wants to agree to the structured plan.


What does it cost to enroll in C-Pay?


On Civil cases (excluding traffic tickets) a one time $25.00 administrative fee will be added to the amount you owe.

On Criminal cases, Traffic cases and Traffic tickets a $25.00 administrative fee will be added to the amount you owe if you choose to pay off your plan within 5 months. An additional $5.00 will be added for each additional month over 5 months.


What will my payments be and how many payments will I have to make?


The Clerk will provide you with various options to choose from.


What happens if my payment is late or if I miss a payment?


Your account may be referred to one of our collection agencies which will cause the remaining amount you owe to increase by 40%.


How do I sign up for C-Pay?


Contact the Collection Department at: 813-276-8100, Extension 3896 for more information.

Edgecomb Courthouse Building
800 E Twiggs Street — Windows 11 and 12
Tampa, FL 33601

Hours of operation are Monday — Friday, 8:00 am until 5:00 pm.